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INTRODUCTION

In its early days, many people perceived the internet as a new space in which
human autonomy, creativity, and productivity could flourish, freed from physical
restrictions and government control.1 Typical of this freethinking spirit was John
Perry Barlow’s 1996 “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,” which
celebrated the newfound autonomy enabled by the internet’s radical
decentralization and warned institutional authorities to keep out.2 Twenty-five
years later, his characterization of the internet as “an act of nature . . . grow[ing]
itself through our collective actions”3 rings increasingly false as a mere handful
of firms dominate their respective corners of the internet.4
The early optimism about the internet has given way to widespread concern
about tech sector concentration, reaching across even starkly drawn political
lines.5 The population at large appears to be souring toward the big internet
companies6 even as their major rally in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic
propped up the sagging economy and powered them to a record share of the
S&P 500.7 On the academic front, a new movement calling for more vigorous
antitrust enforcement to promote competition has gained prominence and

See John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.
(Feb. 8, 1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence.
2 Id.; see also Mike Masnick, Protocols, Not Platforms: A Technological Approach to Free Speech, KNIGHT
FIRST
AMENDMENT
INST.,
5-6
(2019),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/kfaidocuments/documents/e3288c9457/MasnickPublish.pdf (“The early internet involved many
different protocols—instructions and standards that anyone could then use to build a
compatible interface.”).
3 Barlow, supra note 1.
4 John M. Newman, Antitrust in Digital Markets, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1497, 1503 (2019)
(describing high concentration in search engine, e-commerce, social networking, and digital
advertising markets).
5 Brooke Auxier, How Americans See U.S. Tech Companies as Government Scrutiny Increases, PEW
RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/10/27/howamericans-see-u-s-tech-companies-as-government-scrutiny-increases/ (showing almost
identical levels of support between right- and left-leaning voters for regulating big tech
companies, 48% vs. 46%).
6 Scott Rosenberg, Facebook’s Reputation Is Sinking Fast, AXIOS (Mar. 6, 2019),
https://www.axios.com/facebook-reputation-drops-axios-harris-poll-0d6c406a-4c2e-463aaf98-1748d3e0ab9a.html; Sara Fischer & Allison Snyder, Executive Poll: America Sours on Social
Media Giants, AXIOS (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.axios.com/america-sours-on-social-mediagiants-1542234046-c48fb55b-48d6-4c96-9ea9-a36e80ab5deb.html.
7 Peter Eavis & Steve Lohr, Big Tech’s Domination of Business Reaches New Heights, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/19/technology/big-tech-businessdomination.html (“The stocks of Apple, Amazon, Alphabet, Microsoft and Facebook, the five
largest publicly traded companies in America, rose 37 percent in the first seven months this
year, while all the other stocks in the S&P 500 fell a combined 6 percent.”).
1
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traction.8 And politically, both state and federal governments are subjecting big
tech to increasing scrutiny,9 most notably, with a series of antitrust suits against
two of the biggest tech giants, Google and Facebook. The Trump Administration
sued Google in October 2020 for monopolistic practices in its internet
advertising and search engine services.10 It sued Facebook in December 2020 for
anticompetitive conduct in acquiring Instagram and WhatsApp and selectively
excluding developers from its application programming interfaces.11 Dozens of
state attorneys general joined forces in December to bring their own antitrust
suits against Google and Facebook, with only a handful of states abstaining.12
These suits are ongoing, but several have recently been dealt major setbacks.13
These developments signal not only widespread awareness that there is a
problem with the state of the tech sector, but also state and federal governments’
willingness to tackle it. In addition to these antitrust suits, Congress has recently
considered legislative approaches addressing the problem of tech sector
concentration, such as the “Augmenting Compatibility and Competition by
Enabling Service Switching” (ACCESS) Act.14 Its sponsors intend for it to

See Lina Khan, The New Brandeis Movement: America’s Antimonopoly Debate, 9 J. EUR.
COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 131, 132 (2018) (describing the origins, core ideas, and goals of the
resurgent antimonopoly movement); Tim Wu, The Utah Statement: Reviving Antimonopoly
Traditions for the Era of Big Tech, ONEZERO (Nov. 18, 2019), https://onezero.medium.com/theutah-statement-reviving-antimonopoly-traditions-for-the-era-of-big-tech-e6be198012d7
(“The simple premise of anti-monopoly revival is that concentrated private power has become
a menace, a barrier to widespread prosperity, and an indefensible division of the spoils of
progress and economic security that yields human flourishing.”).
9 Darrell M. West, Congressional Hearing Reveals That Tech Firms Will Face Greater Oversight,
(July
29,
2020),
BROOKINGS
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2020/07/29/congressional-hearing-revealsthat-tech-firms-will-face-greater-oversight/; infra note 12.
10 Complaint at 2, United States v. Google LLC, 1:20-cv-03010 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/1329131/download.
11 Complaint at 3, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Facebook, Inc., 1:20-cv-03590-JEB (D.D.C. Dec. 9,
2020),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/051_2021.01.21_revised_partially_red
acted_complaint.pdf [hereinafter Facebook Complaint].
12 Leah Nylen, More Than 30 States File Suit Demanding Breakup of Google, POLITICO (Dec. 17,
2020, 12:57 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/17/3rd-antitrust-lawsuit-hitsgoogle-447741; Taylor Hatmaker, Facebook Hit with Massive Antitrust Lawsuit from 46 States,
TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 9, 2020, 2:58 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2020/12/09/facebookantitrust-state-attorneys-general/.
13 Cecilia Kang, Judge Throws Out 2 Antitrust Cases Against Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/28/technology/facebook-ftc-lawsuit.html.
14 Augmenting Compatibility and Competition by Enabling Service Switching (ACCESS) Act
of 2019, S. 2658, 116th Cong. (2019).
8
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restore competition to the concentrated digital economy,15 thereby giving
Americans more choice and control of their online presence.16
Given that antitrust enforcers are now vigorously attempting to rein in big
tech firms’ anticompetitive practices,17 the question naturally arises whether
sector-specific regulation such as the ACCESS Act is necessary. After all,
regulators already possess an established legal framework for remedying harmful
market concentration in the form of antitrust law.18 The first section of this Note
will explore the inadequacy of current antitrust law to deal with competitive
harms in the internet economy, showing that sector-specific regulation is
necessary. The second section will consider the ACCESS Act as an example of
sector-specific regulation that, although flawed, contains key elements that
address the underlying structural problems of the internet economy.
II. ANTITRUST TOOLS ARE LIKELY INADEQUATE TO REMEDY INTERNET
ECONOMY CONCENTRATION
Antitrust law aims to restrain business practices deemed to harm competition
and, indirectly, consumers.19 The antitrust laws on the books prohibit
unreasonable restraints on trade, such as monopolization or attempt to
monopolize, mergers and acquisitions tending to lessen competition, and unfair

Press Release, Mark Warner, Senator, Senators Introduce Bipartisan Bill to Encourage
Competition
in
Social
Media
(Oct.
22,
2019)
https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=3F2AA8B6-36F8453B-9B59-FC886871CEB9. This Note will discuss the ACCESS Act of 2019, not the bill of
the same name that passed the House Judiciary Committee in June 2021. Augmenting
Compatibility and Competition by Enabling Service Switching (ACCESS) Act of 2021, H.
3849, 117th Cong. (2021). Lauren Feiner, House Committee Passes Sweeping Tech Antitrust Reforms,
But
Their
Future
Remains
Murky,
CNBC
(June
24,
2021),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/24/house-committee-passes-broad-tech-antitrustreforms.html. Despite recent developments on the 2021 bill, the author believes that the 2019
bill offers more effective tools for addressing the internet’s concentration problem. While
similar in many respects to the 2019 bill, the 2021 bill entirely omits ’delegatability,’ a key
provision discussed below, and alters the ‘interoperability’ provision in a way that may
continue to expose user data to exploitation rather than giving users more control over it.
Bennet Cyphers et al., The New ACCESS Act Is a Good Start. Here’s How to Make Sure It Delivers,
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (June 21, 2021), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/06/newaccess-act-good-start-heres-how-make-sure-it-delivers.
16
Mark Warner (@MarkWarner), TWITTER (Oct. 22, 2019, 10:12 AM),
https://twitter.com/MarkWarner/status/1186646482813902848.
17 See supra, notes 10-12 and accompanying text (discussing the recent state and federal antitrust
lawsuits against Google and Facebook).
18 Infra notes 19-21.
19 The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competitionguidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Nov. 2, 2021).
15
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methods of competition.20 Congress passed the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts
between 1890 and 1914 with the aim of “protect[ing] the process of competition
for the benefit of consumers, making sure there are strong incentives for
businesses to operate efficiently, keep prices down, and keep quality up.”21 These
principal antitrust laws presumptively form the first line of defense against harm
to consumers from internet sector concentration. Faced with the increasing
concentration of wealth and power in a handful of internet firms, legal academia
has divided into roughly three camps. First are those who either see no problem
with the current state of affairs or think that if there is an imbalance, it will
inevitably be corrected by disruptive innovation.22 Either way, to this laissez-faire
group, intervention beyond what is already being done is unnecessary.23 Next,
some scholars believe that the current antitrust framework provides adequate
tools to rein the technology sector and just needs to be enforced more
consistently.24 Finally, others believe antitrust is not sufficient to address
competition harms in the digital economy and call for a new set of regulatory
tools.25 This Note argues that the third group is correct and that new regulatory
tools would be more successful in correcting the imbalances of the tech sector.
A. ANTITRUST HAS BEEN WEAKENED BY COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENTS

Although the legislation establishing antitrust law in the U.S. provided its
framework and goals, antitrust doctrine has never “been precisely formulated as
a comprehensive whole.”26 Instead, antitrust developed largely through the
common law process, influenced by a succession of different prevailing
Janice E. Rubin, General Overview of United States Antitrust Law, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 1-3, 5
(June 18, 2001), https://28xeuf2otxva18q7lx1uemec-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wpcontent/uploads/assets/crs/RL31026.pdf.
21 The Antitrust Laws, supra note 19.
22 See Elyse Dorsey, Anything You Can Do, I Can Do Better-Except in Big Tech?: Antitrust's New
Inhospitality Tradition, 68 U. KAN. L. REV. 975, 996 (2020).
23 Rob Frieden, Challenges to the Conventional Wisdom About Mergers and Consumer Welfare in a
Converging Internet Marketplace, 65 VILL. L. REV. 479, 492 (2020) (“Proponents of the status quo
see no reason to abandon adherence to the doctrine of limited government intervention in
markets.”).
24 John M. Newman, Antitrust in Attention Markets: Objections and Responses, 59 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 743, 765 (2020) (“[T]he antitrust enterprise does not lack the requisite tools to oversee
attention-based markets.”).
25 HAROLD FELD, ROOSEVELT INSTITUTE, THE CASE FOR THE DIGITAL PLATFORM ACT, 20
(May 8, 2019), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/RI-Case-forthe-Digital-Platform-Act-201905.pdf; see also Jenny Paquette, Comment, Old Is Not Always
Wise: The Inapplicability of the Sherman Act in the Age of the Internet, 89 TEMP. L. REV. ONLINE 1,
30 (2017) (calling for a statutory update of the current antitrust regime).
26 Thomas E. Kauper, The Goals of United States Antitrust Policy - The Current Debate, 136 J.
INSTITUTIONAL
&
THEORETICAL
ECON.
408,
410
(1980),
http://www.jstor.com/stable/40750242.
20
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ideologies.27 Since the late 1970s, antitrust has morphed from incorporating
societal values about concentration and promoting competition to focusing
narrowly on economic efficiency and consumer welfare.28 As a result, as the
economy faces a new and likely more entrenched form of monopoly in the
internet giants,29 antitrust has lost much of its former power.30 The same
common-law development that gave judges flexibility in promoting antitrust’s
aims now binds judges via stare decisis with four decades’ worth of restricting
antitrust enforcement.31 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice John Roberts,
has increasingly favored large companies over public interest concerns, despite
growing agitation in academia for stricter, revamped antitrust enforcement.32
Thus, the laissez-faire approach has carried the field for the last few decades and,
in so doing, erected substantial barriers to more vigorous enforcement within the
existing framework.33 Further, the consensus view has been that “power in digital
markets will be rare and fleeting, and that enforcement efforts would entail a
prohibitively high risk of chilling innovation.”34 This view has led antitrust
enforcers to take an especially hands-off approach in the internet economy.35
As a result of U.S. antitrust’s common-law development, the federal and state
agencies bringing antitrust suits against large technology companies face steep
obstacles. They must not only rely on doctrines developed long before the
emergence of the internet economy and poorly suited to its dynamics, but must
also overcome decades’ worth of unfavorable precedent to meet their burdens
of proof. Most saliently, federal court precedents and agency standards making
consumer welfare the exclusive aim of antitrust have eroded its capacity to

Id.
Laura Phillips Sawyer, US Antitrust Law and Policy in Historical Perspective 3 (Harv. Bus. Sch.,
Working Paper No. 19-110, 2019), https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/19110_e21447ad-d98a-451f-8ef0-ba42209018e6.pdf; Joshua Wright & Aurelien Portuese,
Antitrust Populism: Towards a Taxonomy, 25 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 131, 176 (2020) (“The
consumer welfare standard is not only a criterion of analysis, but it has legitimately become a
prime —if not exclusive —antitrust objective.”).
29 Newman, supra note 4, at 1522 (pointing out that rather than “self-correcting, digital markets
often facilitate [durable market] power”).
30 Barak Orbach, The Present New Antitrust Era, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1439, 1455-58 (2019)
(describing how the Supreme Court “persistently narrowed the substantive scope of antitrust
law, adopting procedural barriers, and dismantling doctrines associated with the fairness
vision” over the last 40 years).
31 Id. at 1455-58.
32 Id. at 1455; Michael Wolfe, Movements, Moments, and the Eroding Antitrust Consensus, 30
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1157, 1162 (2020) (explaining the emerging NeoBrandeisian antitrust movement).
33 Orbach, supra note 30, at 1456 (listing a number of the ways the Supreme Court raised the
bar for a successful antitrust suit).
34 Newman, supra note 4, at 1500-01.
35 Id. at 1502.
27
28
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restrain big tech’s anticompetitive practices.36 The currently-used measures of
consumer welfare—higher price, lower quality, and stunted innovation—are
more difficult to prove in digital markets.37
Antitrust enforcers have adjusted to these changed conditions with measures
such as scrutinizing firms’ degradation of consumer privacy in zero-price
markets.38 However, agencies adjusting their policies to more rigorously enforce
antitrust law does not alter the underlying framework or the substantive burdens
they must meet to win cases. Rather, that framework is mostly a common-law
development that has moved away from a dynamic and flexible conception of
antitrust’s goals.39 Competition law needs both dynamism and flexibility to adapt
to new features of the digital economy such as the threat to competition from
non-horizontal acquisitions and the structural tendency of digital markets to tip
toward concentration.
B. ANTITRUST FAILS TO PREVENT ANTICOMPETITIVE ACQUISITIONS BY
DOMINANT INTERNET FIRMS

A characteristic of the digital economy which frustrates traditional antitrust
analysis is that, for many proposed acquisitions, the targeted business seems to
operate in a market only tangential to the acquiring company’s main operations,
which deflects government scrutiny.40 When given the pre-merger opportunity,
U.S. regulators declined to challenge Facebook’s acquisitions of WhatsApp and
Instagram41 and Google’s acquisitions in digital advertising, telecommunications,

See Sandeep Vaheesan, Accommodating Capital and Policing Labor: Antitrust in the Two Gilded
Ages, 78 MD. L. REV. 766, 793-94 (2019) (describing how the Supreme Court led the charge to
reorient antitrust exclusively around consumer welfare); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S.
330, 343 (1979) (quoting ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 66 (1978)) (“Congress
designed the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’”).
37 Thomas A. Lambert, The Limits of Antitrust in the 21st Century, 68 U. KAN. L. REV. 1097, 1111
(2020) (noting that with firms “which allow consumers to access their services for free,
showing consumer harm poses a challenge”).
38 Makan Delrahim, U.S. Assistant Att’y. Gen., Antitrust Division, “Blind[ing] Me With
Science”: Antitrust, Data, and Digital Markets, Remarks at Harvard Law School &
Competition Policy International Conference on “Challenges to Antitrust in a Changing
Economy” (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-generalmakan-delrahim-delivers-remarks-harvard-law-school-competition.
39 See supra text accompanying notes 28-30 (explaining how antitrust law came to narrowly
focus on economic efficiency and consumer welfare).
40 FELD, supra note 25, at 38.
41 Rebecca Heilweil, Why the US Government Wants Facebook to Sell Off Instagram and WhatsApp,
VOX (Dec. 9, 2020, 7:04 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/22166437/facebook-instagramftc-attorneys-general-antitrust-monopoly-whatsapp (noting that Facebook’s “acquisitions of
WhatsApp and Instagram were approved by the FTC years ago”).
36
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online video, and home and wearable electronics.42 In fact, the only intervention
Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim could name in 2019 as evidence of
the agency’s willingness to flex its antitrust muscle in digital markets was
unwinding Bazaarvoice’s acquisition of PowerReviews, worth only a tiny fraction
of any of the big internet players.43 This transaction was a textbook horizontal
merger and thus of the type most subject to scrutiny under current antitrust law.44
It involved a firm that controlled over half the relevant market (internet product
reviews) attempting to buy out its only substantial competitor.45 Facebook and
Google’s record of unimpeded acquisitions shows that they have avoided such
obviously anticompetitive transactions even as they have been able to massively
expand and entrench themselves.46 Digital law and policy expert Harold Feld47
notes that the digital nature of the acquiring companies and their targets
“reduce[s] the cost of integration and increase[s] the depth of service offered by
the dominant platform,” which can “delay or even prevent the emergence of
future competitors.”48 In other words, the nature of the digital economy is such
that incumbent tech companies can cement their dominance by acquiring
seemingly unrelated companies.49
David McLaughlin, Big Tech Goes on Shopping Spree, Brushing Off Antitrust Scrutiny, BLOOMBERG
(July 27, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-27/big-tech-goes-onshopping-spree-brushing-off-antitrust-scrutiny (finding that out of hundreds of acquisitions
by big tech firms in the last decade, only a single one was challenged); Infographic: Google’s Biggest
Acquisitions, CB INSIGHTS (Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/googlebiggest-acquisitions-infographic/ (detailing companies Google acquired).
43 Delrahim, supra note 38; Anthony Ha, After Antitrust Suit, Bazaarvoice Sells PowerReviews to
Review Site Viewpoints for $30M, TECHCRUNCH (June 4, 2014, 5:41 PM),
https://techcrunch.com/2014/06/04/bazaarvoice-sells-powerreviews/
(assessing
PowerReviews acquisition value at $168 million); J. Clement, Market Capitalization of the Largest
Internet Companies Worldwide as of February 2021, STATISTA (July 1, 2021),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/277483/market-value-of-the-largest-internetcompanies-worldwide/ (showing that the size of the acquisition was only 0.02% of the $759
billion market capitalization of the smallest of the big five tech companies, Facebook).
44 JEFFREY L. KESSLER & SPENCER WEBER WALLER, § 3:2. HORIZONTAL MERGERS,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND U.S. ANTITRUST LAW § 3:2 (2d ed. 2021).
45 See generally Jay B. Sykes, Antitrust Law: An Introduction, CONG. RSCH. SERV. (May 29, 2019),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF11234.pdf; James B. Stewart, Antitrust Suit is Simple Calculus,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/10/business/att-and-tmobile-merger-is-a-textbook-case.html (describing the proposed T-Mobile-AT&T merger as
a classic subject of antitrust).
46 Chris Alcantara et al., How Big Tech got so big:
POST
(Apr.
21,
2021),
Hundreds
of
acquisitions,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/interactive/2021/amazon-apple-facebookgoogle-acquisitions/.
47 Staff Harold Feld, PUB. KNOWLEDGE https://www.publicknowledge.org/about-us/staff/
(last visited Oct. 19, 2020).
48 FELD, supra note 25, at 38.
49 Id.
42
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Facebook provides an excellent example of this phenomenon in its purchases
of Onavo and WhatsApp. Facebook purchased the app analytics company
Onavo in 2013, marketed it as free data protection, and used it to collect data on
how people used non-Facebook apps.50 Detailed user information from Onavo’s
data harvesting helped alert Facebook that WhatsApp was rapidly growing in
user numbers and engagement relative to its own services,51 which led it to
acquire WhatsApp for a whopping $19 billion in 2014.52 According to internal
Facebook communications, the strong network effects of a dominant social
media firm make the most likely competitor a service with a different core
mechanism (e.g. photo sharing or microblogging).53 If the service is able to build
a large user base, it can then “add[] additional features and functionalities” that
overlap with the dominant firm’s and cut into its market share.54 The federal
antitrust suit against Facebook alleges that by acquiring WhatsApp, Facebook
intended to neutralize a potential competitor.55 The antitrust doctrine of
potential competition is predicated on the idea that acquiring companies, which
are likely to enter concentrated markets, prevents beneficial competition or
removes pressure for incumbent firms to keep prices low.56 However, because
of the doctrine’s “substantial evidentiary hurdles for plaintiffs” and increasingly
skeptical courts,57 “there have been very few litigated merger cases involving
potential competition claims” for the last several decades.”58 Antitrust law, as it
now stands, is inadequately addressing anticompetitive behavior like Facebook’s,
especially given the changed dynamics of how companies interact, grow, and
Deepa Seetharaman & Betsy Morris, Facebook’s Onavo Gives Social-Media Firm Inside Peek at
Rivals’ Users, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebooksonavo-gives-social-media-firm-inside-peek-at-rivals-users-1502622003; Sam Shead, Facebook
Owns the Four Most Downloaded Apps of the Decade, BBC NEWS (Dec. 18, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-50838013 (showing that Facebook paid only $1
billion for Instagram two years before).
51 Karissa Bell, 'Highly Confidential' Documents Reveal Facebook Used VPN App to Track Competitors,
MASHABLE (Dec. 5, 2018), https://mashable.com/article/facebook-used-onavo-vpn-data-towatch-snapchat-and-whatsapp/; Facebook Complaint, supra note 11, at 34–35.
52 Facebook Complaint, supra note 11, at 37.
53 Id. at 32.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 36.
56 Darren Bush & Salvatore Massa, Note, Rethinking the Potential Competition Doctrine, 2004 WIS.
L. REV. 1035, 1046 (2004).
57 Darren S. Tucker, Potential Competition Analysis Under the 2010 Merger Guidelines, 12 SEDONA
CONF. J. 273, 275-76 (2011); see United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602,
624–25 (1974) (listing characteristics that may render a merger unlawful).
58 M. Sean Royall & Adam J. Di Vincenzo, Evaluating Mergers Between Potential Competitors Under
the New Horizontal Merger Guidelines, ANTITRUST, Fall 2010, at 33, 35,
https://www.gibsondunn.com/wpcontent/uploads/documents/publications/RoyallDiVicenzoHorizontalMergerGuidelines.pdf.
50
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compete in the digital economy versus the industrial economy which birthed
antitrust.
C. ANTITRUST FAILS TO ADRESS STRUCTURAL FEAUTURES OF THE INTERNET
ECONOMY THAT MAKES IT SUSCEPTIBLE TO CONCENTRATION

Because concentration in the internet economy stems, in part, from those
changed dynamics, it is not reducible to behavior that falls afoul of traditional
antitrust rules. Thus, harms to competition are not fully remediable by those
rules. Present-day antitrust law regulates the behavior and ownership of firms59
rather than addressing underlying structural features60; it is precisely the
structural features of many internet markets, however, that predispose them to
concentration and consumer harm.61 A number of characteristics make internet
monopoly more dominant and durable than in non-digital markets.62
Digital markets are prone to tipping toward high concentration because of
their high fixed costs, low marginal costs, large returns to scale, and strong
network effects.63 Once a firm makes an initial investment in a successful
platform, its costs often do not rise in proportion to increasing scale.64
Additionally, users and third-party sellers experience valuable network effects,
and it can benefit from the virtuous cycle of increased data collection allowing it
to improve the quality of its services and attract more users.65 Conversely, wouldbe competitors face high costs in launching a platform, lack the qualityenhancing benefits of user data, and face an uphill battle in overcoming network

Sykes, supra note 45, at 1 (“Contemporary antitrust doctrine is focused on preventing these
harms by prohibiting anticompetitive conduct and mergers that enable firms to exercise
market power.”).
60 Lina M. Khan, Amazon's Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 718–19 (2017).
61 Newman, supra note 4, at 1504; see generally Maurice E. Stucke, Should We Be Concerned About
Data-Opolies?, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 275, 285-96 (2018) (describing consumer harms from
internet concentration).
62 Newman, supra note 4 at 1508, 1522; infra notes 63-66.
63 LUIGI ZINGALES & FILIPPO MARIA LANCIERI, STIGLER COMMITTEE ON DIGITAL
PLATFORMS
FINAL
REPORT
35
(2019),
https://www.chicagobooth.edu//media/research/stigler/pdfs/digital-platforms---committee-report---stigler-center.pdf
(hereafter STIGLER REPORT); Nathan Newman, Search, Antitrust, and the Economics of the Control
of User Data, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 401, 451 (2014) (quoting Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the
Change in the Paradigm in Economics, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 460, 463 (2002)) (contending that
companies in information markets can “‘appropriate the returns to creating information’ for
economic advantage in the market in ways not seen in traditional commodities”).
64 STIGLER REPORT, supra note 63, at 36-37.
65 Id. at 37-38; see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(defining network effects as the phenomenon by which “‘the utility that a user derives from
consumption of the good increases with the number of other agents consuming the good.’”);
Stucke, supra note 61 at 320-23 (discussing the durability of digital monopolies).
59
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effects, which form almost insurmountable barriers to entry.66 Google’s failure
to create a popular social media platform despite its massive resources and troves
of user data shows just how potent network effects are in blocking competitive
entry.67 These factors are particularly strong in social media markets; a would-be
competitor faces high obstacles to entry because people already have
“established personal social network[s]” on the incumbent platform.68 Even if
the entrant offers a superior product, users are reluctant to switch because doing
so means losing their “collection of content and connections, and investment of
effort in building each” in the incumbent’s service.69 Users unhappy with the way
big tech companies collect and monetize their data don’t switch away from them
because they are ‘locked in’ by strong network effects,70 or would-be
competitors’ lack of network effects make them less desirable than incumbents.71
Several popular online services exemplify why digital markets tend toward
concentration. Location-logging Google Maps is more popular than privacyfocused Apple Maps among iPhone users because it has more users, and thus,
more traffic information.72 Privacy-oriented Duck Duck Go has less effective
searches than Google Search in part because it has vastly fewer users generating
data.73 Most social media users have an account with a Facebook platform but
have never heard of Mastodon because not many people want to switch to a
platform with such a small user base.74 These network effects are powerful
enough in some cases to overcome such seemingly axiomatic economic
principles as the tendency for consumers to demand less of a good when its
quality declines but its price remains constant.75 Facebook epitomizes this
surprising trend. It kept the ‘price’ for its service constant (at zero dollars) while
STIGLER REPORT, supra note 63, at 36-38; Facebook Complaint, supra note 11, at 37.
Sarah Perez, Looking Back at Google+, TECHCRUNCH, (Oct. 8, 2018),
https://techcrunch.com/2018/10/08/looking-back-at-google/.
68 Facebook Complaint, supra note 11, at 19.
69 Id.
70 Id.; Dina Srinivasan, The Antitrust Case Against Facebook: A Monopolist's Journey Towards Pervasive
Surveillance in Spite of Consumers' Preference for Privacy, 16 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 39, 70-71 (2019).
71 Infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
72 Jackie Dove & Kevin Parrish, Apple Maps vs. Google Maps: Which One Is Best for You?, DIG.
TRENDS (Mar. 9, 2021), https://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/apple-maps-vs-googlemaps/.
73 Stucke, supra note 61, at 321; Sam Hollingsworth, DuckDuckGo vs. Google: An In-Depth Search
Engine
Comparison,
SEARCH
ENGINE
J.
(May
21,
2021),
https://www.searchenginejournal.com/google-vs-duckduckgo/301997/#close.
DuckDuckGo reached its highest monthly share of the U.S. search market in January 2021 at
just 2.6% of the total market compared to Google’s 87.74%. Search Engine Market Share United
States Of America Oct 2020 - Oct 2021, STATCOUNTER, https://gs.statcounter.com/searchengine-market-share/all/united-states-of-america (last visited Nov. 5, 2021).
74 Social Networking, Back in your Hands, MASTODON, https://joinmastodon.org (last visited Oct.
10, 2020) (advertising the decentralized social network’s 4.4 million users).
75 Srinivasan, supra note 70, at 70.
66
67
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degrading its quality by extracting and selling increasing amounts of users’ data—
and still added users.76 These cases clearly display harms antitrust law seeks to
ameliorate: curtailed consumer choice and lack of incentive for firms to improve
their services.77 At the same time, they do not necessarily represent violations of
antitrust law. That means that the recent shift toward more vigorous antitrust
enforcement, even if permanent, cannot address those harms that stem from the
structural predisposition of digital markets toward concentration.78
The crucial factor that underlies both the heightened ability of non-horizontal
acquisition to threaten competition and the tendency of digital markets to tip
toward concentration is the new centrality of data. The increasing amount,
availability, and use of data distinguishes the modern digital economy from the
20th century industries antitrust law was set up to regulate.79 To adapt to this
new reality, the federal government needs tools designed to take into account
and address the structural features of the digital economy.

Id.; Casey Newton, Facebook Usage and Revenue Continue to Grow as the Pandemic Rages On, THE
VERGE (July 30, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/7/30/21348308/facebookearnings-q2-2020-pandemic-revenue-usage-growth (documenting growth in monthly users of
Facebook services to 3.14 billion). This trend is even stranger in light of Facebook’s
plummeting approval ratings. See Rosenberg, supra note 6 (putting Facebook’s public
reputation at 94th out of the 100 most visible U.S. companies).
77 Cf. Donald F. Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and Future of American Antitrust Policy, 75 CAL.
L. REV. 797, 798 (1987) (“Antitrust law is a pro-competition policy. The economic goal of
such a policy is to promote consumer welfare through the efficient use and allocation of
resources, the development of new and improved products, and the introduction of new
production, distribution, and organizational techniques for putting economic resources to
beneficial use.”).
78 European antitrust regulators are already vigorously prosecuting U.S. internet companies
for anticompetitive practices, slapping them with multiple billion-dollar fines. While
astonishingly large, these fines have resulted in little change—big tech companies are
sufficiently “well-capitalized [to] . . . easily shrug off these hefty levies with little, if any,
shareholder pushback.” Mark Scott & Thibault Larger, To Take on Big Tech, US Can Learn
(Aug.
25,
2019),
Antitrust
Lessons
from
Europe,
POLITICO
https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-us-big-tech-competition-antitrust-apple-googlefacebook-amazon/; The EU’s head antitrust enforcer, Margrethe Vestager, admitted that
antitrust fines against U.S. tech companies were “not doing the trick . . . ‘We have to consider
remedies that are much more far-reaching.’” Valentina Pop, She Fined Tech Giants Billions of
Dollars. Now She Wants Sharper Tools., WALL ST. J. (Oct. 15, 2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/she-fined-tech-giants-billions-of-dollars-now-she-wantssharper-tools-11571131520.
79 See generally Daniel McIntosh, We Need to Talk About Data: How Digital Monopolies Arise and
Why They Have Power and Influence, 23 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 185, 191-97 (2019) (documenting
how data-driven network effects enable accumulation of monopoly power in the digital age).
76
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D. SECTOR-SPECIFIC REGULATION, SUCH AS THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT,
IS AN ALTERNATIVE TO ANTITRUST THAT CAN ADDRESS STRUCTURAL
FEATURES OF THE ECONOMY

Congress created antitrust to promote economic competition and protect
consumers as a body of law applying to all companies.80 At times, however, it
has pursued those goals through legislation regulating individual industries, such
as the food, banking, and telecommunications industries.81 The justifications for
this type of legislation originate in common-law regulation of businesses
“affected with a public interest,” which the Supreme Court extended to the thennew technology of grain elevators in Munn v. People of the State of Illinois.82 The
Court ruled in that case that:
Property does become clothed with a public interest when used
in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the
community at large. When, therefore, one devotes his property
to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants
to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be
controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent
of the interest he has thus created.83
According to Feld, this case stands for the proposition that “common
carriage obligations would apply to any new form of business which . . . [was]
affected with the public interest.”84 Twentieth-century U.S. lawmakers and
bureaucrats applied this kind of sector-specific regulation to the providers of new
technologies such as telephony, radio, and television.85 The most salient, and
important, recent example of sector-specific regulation was the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (hereafter the “Telecommunications Act”),
which combined new structural regulations for the telecommunications sector
with a rollback of existing behavioral regulations.86 Congress intended the
Telecommunications Act to alter the underlying market structure to promote
FELD, supra note 25, at 48 (“By its nature as a law of general applicability, antitrust law does
not focus specifically on any one industry. Even at its most aggressive, it is reactive rather than
pro-active, generally operating via enforcement action.”).
81 Id. at 50, 59.
82 Id. at 49.
83 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
84 FELD, supra note 25, at 50.
85 UNDERSTANDING MEDIA AND CULTURE, 609-11 (Minn. Librs. Publishing ed. 2016),
https://open.lib.umn.edu/mediaandculture/open/download?type=print_pdf.
86 Nicholas Economides, Telecommunications Regulation: An Introduction, in THE LIMITS OF
MARKET ORGANIZATION 48, 59 (Richard R. Nelson ed., 2005); Thomas W. Hazlett, Rivalrous
Telecommunications Networks With and Without Mandatory Sharing, 58 FED. COMMC’NS. L.J. 477,
478 (2006).
80
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competition, which would correct for the market’s imbalances and allow for it to
continue sustainably with less need for governmental interference.87 The
Telecommunications Act, in particular its interconnection mandate designed to
open up local telephone markets to competition, can serve as a guide for sectorspecific regulation in the internet economy.
1. Background and Structure of the Telecommunications Act
Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act in the aftermath of the
breakup of AT&T’s telecommunications monopoly.88 From the 1930s to the 80s,
AT&T had “dominated all aspects of telecommunications in the United States .
. . [with] approximately 90% market share of local access lines and over 90% of
the long-distance revenue.”89 In 1984, AT&T settled a decade-long antitrust suit
by spinning off its local telephone services into seven regional operating
companies.90 The long-distance telephone market proved amenable to
competition, and AT&T’s dominance of that market gradually declined.91 The
local telephone markets, by contrast, remained dominated by the regional Bell
Operating Companies (RBOCs) formed by the breakup,92 which were regulated
as monopolies and prohibited from entering the long-distance market.93
In order to promote competition in these concentrated local markets,94 the
Telecommunications Act included a mandatory unbundling provision requiring
incumbent local telephone carriers to sell the use of disaggregated components
of their networks to new entrants at wholesale price.95 This effectively forced
them to “‘share’ with their competitors the inherent economies of scale built into
their ubiquitous local networks.”96 Prices were to be determined through either
private negotiation, or failing that, set by the government.97 The goal was to
provide a “stepping stone [into local telephone markets] for new networks,

FELD, supra note 25, at 22-23.
Jon Reid, AT&T Antitrust Fight Gives Lawmakers Road Map to Rein in Big Tech, BLOOMBERG
L. (Mar. 24, 2021), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/tech-and-telecom-law/at-t-antitrustfight-gives-lawmakers-road-map-to-rein-in-big-tech.
89 Economides, supra note 86, at 54.
90 Id. at 55.
91 Id.
92 Hanlong Fu et al., The Impact of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 in the Broadband Age, in 8
ADVANCES IN COMMC’NS & MEDIA RSCH. 117, 124-25 (Anthony V. Stavros ed., 2011).
93 Economides, supra note 86, at 55, 57-58.
94 Mark D. Schneider et al., The USTA Decisions and the Rise and Fall of Telephone Competition, 22
COMMC’N. LAW. 1, 18 (2004).
95 J. Gregory Sidak, The Failure of Good Intentions: The WorldCom Fraud and the Collapse of American
Telecommunications After Deregulation, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 207, 214 (2003).
96 George S. Ford & Lawrence J. Spiwak, Lessons Learned from the U.S. Unbundling Experience, 68
FED. COMMC’N. L.J. 95, 123 (2016).
97 Hazlett, supra note 86, at 478.
87
88
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which would then have the economic ability and incentive to construct new
facilities of their own.”98
2. Market Outcomes of the Telecommunications Act
While network facility sharing was technically mandatory, the
Telecommunications Act eschewed penalties for noncompliance in favor of the
‘carrot’ of entry into the long-distance market, which RBOCs remained
prohibited from entering until they had complied with the mandate.99 Given the
lack of penalties for not complying with the unbundling mandate, RBOCs opted
to “delay entry of their local networks to competition as long as possible, even if
that would lead to delay of their entry into the long-distance service market.”100
They simultaneously engaged in a lengthy legal battle against the
Telecommunications Act’s interconnection provisions, which produced
substantial uncertainty in pricing and implementation of network
interconnection and depressed competitive entry into local telephone markets.101
Nonetheless, the immediate effect of the Telecommunications Act was a
boom in telecommunications investment, which by 2004 had led to competing
local carriers capturing "20% of the total market[] using unbundled elements
made available by the rules implementing the 1996 Act.”102 As a result of
competition from this network facility sharing, consumers paid less for phone
service.103 The facility sharing rules that fostered competition were issued by the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the agency that oversees
telecommunications regulation.104 In 2004, however, the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals overturned the facility sharing regime,105 to which the FCC responded
by effectively foreclosing facility sharing as the basis of a viable business plan.106
As local telephone facility sharing rapidly phased out, the competition Congress
hoped to catalyze came instead from the emergence of new technology: cell
phones and voice services becoming available over broadband internet
connections.107

Id.
Schneider et al. supra note 94, at 18.
100 Economides, supra note 86, at 66.
101 Id.; Hazlett, supra note 86, at 485 (quoting an unnamed analyst) (“This is an eight-year, clawyour-opponent's-eye-out battle regulatorily, legally and politically.”).
102 Ford et al., supra note 96, at 99.
103 Schneider et al. supra note 94, at 18 (explaining local telephone companies’ view that
consumer savings stemmed from forced “unsustainable low wholesale pricing” that would
eventually bankrupt them).
104 UNDERSTANDING MEDIA AND CULTURE, supra note 91, at 611.
105 Hazlett, supra note 86, at 485.
106 Ford et al., supra note 96, at 99.
107 Id. at 100 (stating that by 2016, once-dominant incumbent local telephone companies
“serve[d] fewer than half of all access lines”).
98
99
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In retrospect, the economics of facilities-based local telephone service
provision were almost certainly insufficient to offer adequate returns on the
capital needed to build out entirely separate infrastructure from that which
already existed.108 Thus, the Telecommunications Act’s facility sharing mandate
was probably never a reasonable stepping stone to competing wireline telephone
providers building their own local facilities, but rather an opportunity for them
to offer telecommunication services without such expensive investment.109 The
Telecommunications Act’s enticement for RBOCs to share their facilities, access
to the long-distance market, proved insufficient to overcome their natural
reluctance to help competitors undercut their dominance.110 All told, the
Telecommunications Act’s central structural regulation failed to bring about the
sustainable competition in local telephone markets its architects intended to
create. That competition eventually arrived from entirely new technology, not as
a result of the facility sharing mandate.111 As this Note turns to sector-specific
regulation of large internet firms, its analysis will be guided by the goals, policy
tools, and outcomes of the Telecommunications Act.
III. THE ACCESS ACT IS A PROMISING STEP TOWARDS CORRECTING THE
INTERNET ECONOMY’S STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS
This Note has expressed doubts about the effectiveness of current antitrust
law to remedy competitive harms in the digital economy and explored the
possibility of using non-antitrust legislation specific to that sector to regulate
internet companies. Several such proposals have been put forward, including the
ACCESS Act, which is a promising step toward correcting some of the digital
economy’s structural problems. Senators Mark Warner (D-VA), Richard
Blumenthal (D-CT), and Josh Hawley (R-MO) introduced the ACCESS Act on
October 22, 2019.112 In a long tweet thread the same day, Sen. Warner pitched it
as reinvigorating competition in the digital marketplace.113 According to Sen.
Warner, the ACCESS Act’s purpose is to “remove the current barriers to
consumer choice and put Americans back in control of their data and their
communications.”114 The next section of this Note will provide an overview of
the ACCESS Act and examine its three core policy proposals: data portability,

Id. at 123-24.
Id. at 123.
110 Id. at 124 (“[N]o firm will ever be enthusiastic about consciously going against its own selfinterests by selling its rivals their key input of production . . . .”).
111 Hazlett, supra note 86, at 480 (“[T]he transition to competitive networks anticipated in the
1996 Act has been largely achieved, albeit through the development of alternative
telecommunications systems not aided by mandatory network sharing rules.”).
112 Warner, supra note 15, at 1.
113 Warner, supra note 16.
114 Id.
108
109
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interoperability, and delegatability.115 Providing insight on these proposals will
be Mike Masnick’s116 article, Protocols, Not Platforms: A Technological Approach to Free
Speech,117 and Harold Feld’s book, The Case for the Digital Platform Act.118
A. CORE PROVISIONS OF THE ACCESS ACT

Before discussing the ACCESS Act’s core provisions—portability,
interoperability, and delegatability, it is important to note that it applies narrowly
to “large communications platforms.”119 These are products or services of
“consumer-facing communications and information services provider[s]” that:
“(A) generate[] income, directly or indirectly, from the collection, processing,
sale, or sharing of user data; and (B) ha[ve] more than 100,000,000 monthly active
users in the United States.”120 Popular platforms like Twitter, Snapchat, and
Pinterest fall below this high threshold, leaving only a handful of the biggest:
Facebook, Instagram (owned by Facebook), YouTube (owned by Google), Tik
Tok, and LinkedIn (owned by Microsoft).121 Only those platforms with more
than 100 million U.S. users would be subject to the ACCESS Act’s portability,
interoperability, and delegatability requirements.122

Id.
Mike Masnick, PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT, https://anti-slapp.org/mike-masnick (last
visited Oct. 19, 2020) (“Mike Masnick is the founder & editor of the popular Techdirt blog as
well as the founder of the Silicon Valley think tank, the Copia Institute. In both roles, he
explores the intersection of technology, innovation, policy, law, civil liberties, and
economics.”).
117 Masnick, supra note 2.
118 FELD, supra note 25.
119 Augmenting Compatibility and Competition by Enabling Service Switching (ACCESS) Act
of 2019, S. 2658, 116th Cong. §§ 3-5 (2019).
120 Id. § 2(7).
121 Adam Warner, Which Social Media Platform Has the Most Users? (2021), WEBSITE PLANET,
https://www.websiteplanet.com/blog/social-media-platform-users/ (last accessed Nov. 6,
2021) (listing Facebook, Instagram, YouTube as having more than 100 million active monthly
U.S. users); Brian Dean, TikTok User Statistics (2021), BACKLINK (Oct. 11, 2021),
https://backlinko.com/tiktok-users (over 100 million users); LinkedIn Statistics and Facts,
MARKET.US (last visited Nov. 16, 2021), https://market.us/statistics/social-media/linkedin/
(310 million users); Brian Dean, How Many People Use Twitter in 2021?, BACKLINK (Oct. 8,
2021), https://backlinko.com/twitter-users#users-by-country (73 million users); L. Ceci,
Number of Snapchat Users in the United States from 2018 to 2023, STATISTA (Aug. 4, 2021),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/558227/number-of-snapchat-users-usa/ (87.3 million
users); Number of Monthly Active Pinterest Users from 1st quarter 2016 to 2nd quarter 2021, by Region,
STATISTA (Nov. 11, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/995071/pinterest-app-mauregion/ (91 million users).
122 Id. §§ 3-5.
115
116
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1. Data Portability
Data portability means users are able to move the data they generated on one
service to different services, including competing ones.123 Many large internet
firms have made it possible for users to download all their personal data.124 An
already-existing legal regime that requires data portability, the EU’s General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR), goes further. It requires that they make that data
available to users in a format that is both “structured, commonly used[,] and
machine readable” and formatted in a way that an individual can make use of
it.125 The ACCESS Act adopts a version of GDPR’s portability mandate, but
additionally requires such transfers to be made upon a user’s request to a
“competing communications provider,” which bypasses the onerous task of
downloading and then uploading large amounts of data.126
Big tech’s response to GDPR’s portability mandate is helpful for
understanding the pitfalls the ACCESS Act will have to avoid being unsuccessful.
For large internet firms, such as Facebook and Google, data is their key input,
analogous to the infrastructure which the Telecommunications Act ordered
incumbent local telephone companies to share with competitors.127 Thus,
companies that already hold significant amounts of user data should, in theory,
be reluctant to share it in a way that will benefit competitors. It’s true that many
large tech companies are part of the Data Transfer Project, which allows people
to move their data between participating platforms,128 or have their own
portability features.129 But these existing examples of portability have not
Allen St. John, Europe's GDPR Brings Data Portability to U.S. Consumers, CONSUMER REP.
(May 25, 2018), https://www.consumerreports.org/privacy/gdpr-brings-data-portability-tous-consumers/; see also Whitney Nixdorf, Planting in A Walled Garden: Data Portability Policies to
Inform Consumers How Much (If Any) of the Harvest Is Their Share, 29 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 135, 139 (2019) (discussing the legal implications of data portability).
124 GDPR Chap. 3, Art. 20; Dylan Curran, Are You Ready? Here Is All the Data Facebook and
Google
Have
on
You,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
30,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/mar/28/all-the-data-facebook-googlehas-on-you-privacy.
125
Right to Data Portability, INFO. COMM’R’S OFFICE, https://ico.org.uk/fororganisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulationgdpr/individual-rights/right-to-data-portability/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2020) (listing formats
“appropriate for data portability” under GDPR).
126 Augmenting Compatibility and Competition by Enabling Service Switching (ACCESS) Act
of 2019, S. 2658, 116th Cong. § 3(a) (2019).
127 Supra note 95-97 and accompanying text; McIntosh, supra note 79, at 201-02 (describing
how it is control of vast troves of data that gives Google and Facebook such great power and
innovative potential).
128 Russell Brandom, Apple Joins Google, Facebook, and Twitter in Data-Sharing Project, THE VERGE
(July 30, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/30/20746868/apple-data-transferproject-google-microsoft-twitter.
129 Michael Grothaus, Here’s How to See the Data That Tech Giants Have About You, FAST
COMPANY (May 25, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/40567706/heres-how-to-see-the123
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provided small tech companies a foothold because they were designed for
individual use130 and are in some cases actually deliberatively not useful for
would-be competitors.131
For instance, while Facebook allowed users to download their data in a
format accessible to app developers, a team of programmers at
ProgrammableWeb found that the functionality of the provided data was
limited.132 They discovered that the downloadable data was missing key
information needed to allow a competitor to reconstruct a user’s Facebook
history in a format remotely similar to how it appeared on Facebook.133 The team
also ran into obstacles to porting their Facebook accounts’ social graphs, a term
that refers to the web of interconnections with other users.134 Because social
graphs contain other people’s data, Facebook does not allow users to port this
crucial portion of their data without getting the consent of those it belongs to.135
The developers found that to be able to request that consent from other users,
they would need Facebook approval for their app, but, perhaps not surprisingly,
the company ignored their approval requests.136 The team concluded that
“Facebook imposes very real constraints on the data you can access, from the
obfuscation of permissions and data relationships, intentional or not, to limiting
access to your friends' information.”137
As this Note has shown, the technology for porting data already exists, and
big tech companies are expanding data portability.138 But without more rigorous
data-that-tech-giants-have-about-you (detailing large tech companies’ user data download
options).
130 Craig Shank, Microsoft, Facebook, Google and Twitter Introduce the Data Transfer Project: An Open
Source Initiative for Consumer Data Portability, MICROSOFT (July 20, 2018),
https://blogs.microsoft.com/eupolicy/2018/07/20/microsoft-facebook-google-and-twitterintroduce-the-data-transfer-project-an-open-source-initiative-for-consumer-data-portability/
(describing one of the project’s standards as a “focus on data that has utility for the individual
user” rather than “enterprise data”).
131 Shelby Switzer, I Tried Getting My Data Out of Facebook Before Quitting. I Even Wrote Code. It
Didn't
Go
Well.,
PROGRAMMABLEWEB
(July
2,
2019),
https://www.programmableweb.com/news/i-tried-getting-my-data-out-facebook-quitting-ieven-wrote-code-it-didnt-go-well/analysis/2019/07/02.
132 Id. (stating that Facebook’s provided format for data downloading made nearly impossible
“even something as simple as uploading those photos along with their descriptions to a Google
Photos album”).
133 Id.
134 Id. (defining social graph as “the context behind, and relationships between, your photos,
events, status updates, links, contacts, groups, and more.”); see also Facebook Complaint, supra
note 11, at 15.
135 Switzer, supra note 131 (“[Y]ou can't get any information about your friends: their names,
their contact info, or even the posts they've made on your wall unless those posts are public.”).
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
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portability requirements, large internet firms can do so in a way that prevents
users from benefitting potential competitors like the team at ProgrammableWeb.
Dominant platforms can generate positive publicity by promoting large-scale
projects like the Data Transfer Project, while ensuring in more granular and
technical ways that their portability options cannot facilitate a real exodus of
users to a competing platform.139
Meanwhile, existing U.S. legal precedent appears to conflict with a portability
mandate, by affirming platforms’ right to prevent their users from (1) posting
content from a competitor140 and (2) allowing another company to access their
accounts.141 These rulings stem from the antitrust principle that there is no duty
to deal with competitors, which is in tension with a data portability mandate.142
Incumbent tech firms have used this aspect of antitrust law to quash upstart
competitors and cement their own dominance.143 Accordingly, the ACCESS
Act’s data portability requirements could be a major step forward in promoting
internet platform competition, but only if companies are made to comply with
the Act’s intent and not just its bare technical requirements.144 As this section
has discussed, data portability is unlikely to have much positive effect on internet
users unless companies make data available in a form that has functionality when
imported to a competing service.145 The ACCESS Act’s next core provision
instantiates that concept—interoperability.

See supra text accompanying notes 132-37 (detailing the obstacles that one such platform,
Facebook, placed in the way of anyone trying to effectively port their data to a competing
service).
140 Nixdorf, supra note 123, at 144 (summarizing LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., No. CV
06-6994 AHM (RZx), 2007 WL 6865852, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2007), aff'd, 304 F. App’x
554 (9th Cir. 2008)) (“LiveUniverse, the operator of social networking site vidilife, sued
MySpace for preventing users from incorporating content from vidilife in their MySpace
profiles. The court held that MySpace had not engaged in exclusionary conduct . . . .”).
141 Id. at 144 (summarizing Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., No. C 08-05780 JW, 2010
WL 3291750, at *1, *13-14 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2010), aff’d Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures,
Inc., 844 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2016)) (“Facebook had not engaged in exclusionary conduct
when it prevented social media aggregator Power Ventures from accessing Facebook user
accounts, even though Power Ventures had users' permission . . . .”).
142 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004)
(quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)) (holding that the Sherman
Act generally “‘does not restrict the long recognized right of [a] trader or manufacturer . . . to
exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.’”).
143 Chinmayi Sharma, Concentrated Digital Markets, Restrictive APIs, and the Fight for Internet
Interoperability, 50 U. MEM. L. REV. 441, 473–74, 455–56 (2019).
144 See, e.g., St. John, supra note 123 (quoting Justin Brookman, Consumers Union’s Privacy and
Technology Policy Director) (“If the data you get from a company is incomplete or difficult
to use, the impact [of data portability] will be limited.”).
145 Nixdorf, supra note 123, at 151 ([D]ata portability . . . does not solve the much-maligned
“lock-in” problem because network effects persist, even with portability, in the absence of
interoperability.”).
139
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2. Interoperability
This Note has examined how data portability, in isolation, has failed to
counteract the lock-in effects of large platforms. In Sen. Warner’s words:
“[P]ortability isn't enough if there's nobody to share content or communicate
with on a new network or service.”146 So the ACCESS Act requires large
platforms to implement “[t]ransparent, third-party-accessible interfaces
(including application programming interfaces) to facilitate and maintain
technically compatible, interoperable communications with a user of a
competing communications provider.”147
Interoperability relies on common application programming interfaces
(APIs), which allow for “points of interconnection” and interactivity with
platforms.148 Such “open” APIs are often part of proprietary software that can
be used subject to licensing terms.149 These terms may make APIs “essentially
unworkable for potential competitors,” as with the cable industry’s so-called
open proprietary standards.150 Licensing policies may also be deployed selectively
to keep would-be competitors from gaining ground at the incumbent’s
expense.151 Facebook selectively barred access to one of its vital APIs, the Find
Friends function, in order to stamp out numerous upstart competitors.152 It
banned the use of Facebook APIs to “‘replicate core functionality that Facebook
already provides’[]” until December 2018, when it retracted the policy under
pressure.153 These examples from cable and social media demonstrate that
interoperability must be robust and not subject to self-dealing by incumbent
firms if it is to effectively promote competition.
The ACCESS Act would impose many requirements on large platforms
pursuant to implementing interoperability, including: (1) setting reasonable usage
expectations and thresholds for free access requests over which, with notice, they

Warner, supra note 16.
Augmenting Compatibility and Competition by Enabling Service Switching (ACCESS) Act
of 2019, S. 2658, 116th Cong. § 4(a) (2019).
148 FELD, supra note 25, at 81.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Josh Constine, Facebook Shouldn’t Block You from Finding Friends on Competitors, TECHCRUNCH
(Apr. 13, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/13/free-the-social-graph/.
152 Id. (detailing how Facebook’s selective access restrictions torpedoed Voxer, MessageMe,
Phhhoto, and Vine).
153 Josh Constine, Facebook Ends Platform Policy Banning Apps That Copy Its Features,
TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 4, 2018, 6:09 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/12/04/facebookallows-competitors/; Facebook Complaint, supra note 11, at 8 (stating that Facebook
suspended the ban “under the glare of international antitrust and regulatory scrutiny”).
146
147
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may charge reasonable fees;154 (2) establishing security and privacy standards;155
(3) refraining from changing the interoperability interface in a way that denies
access or undermines interoperability;156 and (4) providing “complete and
accurate documentation describing access to the interoperability interface.”157
An important non-commercialization provision applies to both the platform and
its interoperating competitor equally; neither can “collect, use, or share user data”
from the other except to protect their “privacy and security” and “maintain[]
interoperability of services.”158 That means the incumbent platform cannot
monetize data obtained via interoperability from the competing platform and
vice versa.159 Instead, the interoperability functionality is aimed at helping upstart
internet platforms overcome incumbents’ network effects and compete with
them on a level playing field.160
Such interoperability mandates are not unprecedented. The ACCESS Act’s
requirement that incumbent internet platforms allow competitors to
interconnect echoes the Telecommunications Act’s mandate for incumbent local
telephone companies discussed above. This similarity makes the
Telecommunications Act useful for assessing the wisdom and feasibility of the
ACCESS Act’s interoperability mandate. For now, however, consider an
example from the early internet economy.
In 2001, the FCC forced AOL to make its instant messaging platforms—
most prominently, AOL Instant Messenger (AIM)—interoperable with
competitors.161 At the time, AOL’s messaging services accounted for 90% of the
instant messaging market.162 Making AIM compatible with rival messaging
services allowed consumers to access their digital connections through different
services.163 This inrush of what turned out to be more innovative competition
doomed AIM, which eventually shut down in 2017.164 Depending on one’s
outlook, the case of AIM could be viewed either as illegitimate government
favoritism toward certain firms over another or the removal of a market barrier
that inefficiently protected an established service from more innovative
Augmenting Compatibility and Competition by Enabling Service Switching (ACCESS) Act
of 2019, S. 2658, 116th Cong. §§ 4(c)(2)(B)(i)-(iv) (2019).
155 Id. § 4(c)(2)(B)(v).
156 Id. § 4(c)(2)(C).
157 Id. § 4(c)(4).
158 Id. §§ 4(c)(6), (d).
159 Id.
160 Warner, supra note 15.
161 Louise Matsakis, Regulate Facebook Like AIM, VICE (Oct. 6, 2017, 2:51 PM),
https://www.vice.com/en/article/mb7n7v/aim-aol-instant-messenger-regulation-facebookending.
162
MS to AOL: End IM Stranglehold, WIRED (June 8, 2000, 1:10 PM),
https://www.wired.com/2000/06/ms-to-aol-end-im-stranglehold/.
163 Matsakis, supra note 161.
164 Id.
154
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competitors. Naturally, the sponsors of the ACCESS Act believe it does the
latter.165 The final core mechanism they introduce toward removing the market
barrier of network effects is delegatability.
3. Delegatability
The ACCESS Act’s data possibility and interoperability provisions make
delegatability possible. Delegatability means the ability of internet platform users
to appoint a third-party service “to interact with the platform on their behalf.”166
It can fundamentally change users’ relationship with internet platforms from the
current model in which platforms both host and curate content for users.
Delegatability can split the roles of host and curator and give users the choice of
whether the same entity does both.167 A robust form of delegatibility would give
potential competitors to Facebook or Twitter or YouTube the opportunity to
compete for those already using those services by offering a “different, or better,
interface to [them]” instead of trying to build their own equivalent, says
Masnick.168 But robust delegatability, in which third-party interfaces offer
variations on content moderation and the overall user experience,169 could raise
concerns about expropriation and state-sponsored freeloading.170 That is
perhaps why the sponsors of the ACCESS Act opted to maintain delegatability
by emphasizing its role in privacy management171 and limiting how firms to
which users delegate access can monetize their services.172
Delegatability under the ACCESS Act is limited to “custodial third-party
agent[s] . . . authorized by a user to interact with a large communications platform
provider on that user’s behalf to manage the user’s online interactions, content,
Warner, supra note 15 (explaining that the ACCESS Act will loosen the “exclusive
dominance of Facebook and Google,” facilitating “meaningful competition” and
“technological innovation”).
166 Bennett Cyphers & Cory Doctorow, A Legislative Path to an Interoperable Internet, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. (July 28, 2020), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/07/legislative-pathinteroperable-internet.
167 Masnick, supra note 2, at 18 (allowing “many different individuals and organizations . . . to
tweak the system to their own levels of comfort and share them with others” rather than the
platform serving as “single-source arbiter”).
168 Id. at 15.
169 Id. at 17-18.
170 See generally James Pethokoukis, Washington vs. Big Tech: Should You ‘Own’ All Your Social
Network Data? An AEIdeas Online Symposium, AM. ENTER. INST. (Oct. 10, 2017),
https://www.aei.org/economics/washington-vs-big-tech-should-you-own-all-your-socialnetwork-data-an-aeideas-online-symposium/ (quoting University of Nebraska College of Law
professor Gus Hurtwitz) (opining that an interoperability mandate “wouldn’t so much allow
other firms to interconnect with Facebook or limit the network effects of the social graph as
it would dissolve Facebook as a going concern into a pool of social media acid.”).
171 Warner, supra note 16 (describing delegatability as “the idea that consumers should be able
to allow a third-party service to manage their privacy settings across multiple platforms.”).
172 Infra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
165
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and account settings.”173 Third-party agents responsibilities include: protecting
user data,174 “not access[ing] or manag[ing] a user’s online interactions, content,
or account settings” so as to benefit the agent at the user’s expense,175 and
conforming to the user’s “directions or reasonable expectations.”176 Significantly,
custodial third-party agents “shall not collect, use, or share any user data
provided to it by a user, or accessed on a user’s behalf” for their own commercial
benefit.177 This means the entities to which the ACCESS Act allows delegation
cannot compete directly with internet platforms by adopting their monetization
strategy—collecting user data. The sponsors of the ACCESS Act instead expect
these third-party data custodians to charge a fee to manage users’ privacy settings
across the different platforms they use.178
Despite the limitations on the potential business models data custodians can
employ, the ACCESS Act is compatible with a more robust form of
delegatability. In particular, the Act’s broad language allowing data custodians to
“manage the user’s online interactions, content, and account settings”179 suggests
that they could serve as customizable content curators. Presently, internet
platforms use complex and opaque algorithms to determine what content
appears to users.180 Since their business model depends on user engagement (i.e.,
time spent on the platform), they prioritize content that maximizes engagement,
often disseminating material that generates outrage over that which is true,
reputable, and thoughtful.181 Users are likely to have different priorities for what
content appears in their feeds.182 Under the current regime, internet users face a
binary choice: use the dominant platform, and abdicate control over the content
Augmenting Compatibility and Competition by Enabling Service Switching (ACCESS) Act
of 2019, S. 2658, 116th Cong. § 2(5) (2019).
174 Id. § 5(f)(1).
175 Id. § 5(f)(2)(A).
176 Id. § 5(f)(2).
177 Id. § 5(f)(3).
178 Id. § 5(g).
179 Augmenting Compatibility and Competition by Enabling Service Switching (ACCESS) Act
of 2019, S. 2658, 116th Cong. § 2(5) (2019).
180 Joanna Stern, Social-Media Algorithms Rule How We See the World. Good Luck Trying to Stop
Them., WALL ST. J. (Jan. 17, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/social-media-algorithmsrule-how-we-see-the-world-good-luck-trying-to-stop-them-11610884800.
181 STIGLER REPORT, supra note 63, at 62; see also Peter Dizikes, Study: On Twitter, False News
Travels Faster Than True Stories, MIT NEWS (Mar. 8, 2018), https://news.mit.edu/2018/studytwitter-false-news-travels-faster-true-stories-0308 (finding that Twitter “falsehood[s] diffuse[]
significantly farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth, in all categories of
information.”); Keach Hagey et al., Facebook Tried to Make Its Platform a Healthier Place. It Got
Angrier Instead., WALL ST. J. (Sept. 15, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebookalgorithm-change-zuckerberg-11631654215?mod=article_inline (explaining how Facebook’s
algorithm tweaks, designed to increase engagement, boosted “[m]isinformation, toxicity, and
violent content”).
182 See Masnick, supra note 2, at 17-18.
173
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they are exposed to, or go without the platform altogether, which is a daunting
and isolating prospect for many.183 Delagatability, as called for by the ACCESS
Act, has the potential to give internet users the best of both worlds—the
connectedness of a vibrant platform and more autonomy and control over their
online experience.
B. STRENGTHS OF THE ACCESS ACT

The ACCESS Act is a nuanced yet forceful effort to address the underlying
dynamics of internet markets that contribute to unhealthy concentration. It
formulates an approach that builds on the Telecommunications Act and
incorporates some of the lessons learned from that attempt at structural
intervention to correct market imbalance. The real-world outcomes of the
Telecommunications Act are helpful in considering how the ACCESS Act would
work if enacted.
Despite the significant confounding variables of legal uncertainty
surrounding the Telecommunications Act’s unbundling mandate and the
emergence of substitutes to traditional wired telephony, several key takeaways
are apparent. First, forcing incumbents to share their facilities with competitors
did induce competitors to enter formerly monopolistic markets and helped lower
consumer prices.184 Second, facility-sharing appeared nonetheless not to be a
feasible stepping-stone for entering competitors to build their own facilities.185
Third, the structural regulation was thus more of a forced transfer of surplus
from incumbent firms to entrants than a temporary intervention to accomplish
a specific purpose.186 Finally, incumbent telephone companies, who were bestpositioned to determine the ‘reasonable price’ to charge competitors to use their
facilities, had every incentive to instead price out and otherwise obstruct
competitors.187
The ACCESS Act incorporates some of the lessons of the
Telecommunications Act a generation before. Its sponsors recognize that

See Aja Romano, How Facebook Made It Impossible to Delete Facebook, VOX (Dec. 20, 2018),
https://www.vox.com/culture/2018/3/22/17146776/delete-facebook-how-to-quit-difficult
(noting how embedded Facebook is in modern society); see also Harper Neidig, Facebook Ends
2018
with
Record
Profits,
THE
HILL
(Jan.
30,
2019),
https://thehill.com/policy/technology/427732-facebook-ends-2018-with-record-profits
(“[T]he #DeleteFacebook campaign has failed to make a noticeable dent on the company's
finances . . . .”).
184 Ford et al., supra note 96, at 99; Schneider et al., supra note 94, at 18.
185 See supra text accompanying notes 109-110 (explaining that constructing duplicative local
wired telephone infrastructure was not economically justified).
186 See Ford et al., supra note 96, at 123, 124 (describing the Telecommunications Act’s mandate
that incumbent telephone companies provide competitors access to their facilities at cost).
187 See supra text accompanying notes 110, 101 (describing incumbent telephone companies’
resistance to and efforts to undermine the mandate).
183
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injecting competition into monopoly markets benefits consumers but that
conditions in the internet economy, like those in local telephone markets, require
structural regulation to facilitate competition.188 At the same time, they are
committed to the idea that structural intervention can be a stepping-stone for
new entrants to eventually being able to compete with the incumbent on their
own terms.189 To that end, the ACCESS Act contains mechanisms designed to
impede entering firms from becoming long-term parasites of the incumbent,
with no other business model than freeloading off of the incumbent.
Competing platforms’ access to the incumbent’s data obtained through the
interoperability interface is limited to facilitating interoperability and protecting
user privacy and security; commercialization is prohibited under Section 4(d).190
The competing platform would still be able to commercialize the data imported
by its user but not the data accessed from users of the incumbent platform who
had not provided the competing platform their data. In practice, this prevents a
competing platform from building its business model on extracting valuable data
from an incumbent platform. Rather, a competing platform could only directly
financially benefit from its own users and the content they generated, which
means it would need to grow its own user base to generate sustainable revenues.
The ACCESS Act’s intervention would thus only provide an indirect financial
benefit to competing platforms, by overcoming the lock-in effects that makes it
difficult for new internet platforms to enter concentrated markets and enable
them to attract users of incumbent firms.191 Therefore, while it works via a
similar mechanism to the Telecommunications Act’s unbundling mandate, the
ACCESS Act’s interoperability mandate creates a more feasible stepping stone
for competing platforms to overcome network effects and gain market share on
the strength of their own service.
The ACCESS Act’s limitations on delegatability, most prominently the ban
on data custodians commercializing user data,192 present a challenge to
monetizing these services. Most platforms make their money from advertising,
especially targeted advertising based on user data.193 Preventing data custodians
from monetizing through targeted ads would make offering data custodian
Warner, supra note 15.
Id.
190 Augmenting Compatibility and Competition by Enabling Service Switching (ACCESS) Act
of 2019, S. 2658, 116th Cong. § 4(d) (2019).
191 See supra notes 63-64 (explaining why internet platforms exhibit lock-in effects); Spencer
W. Waller, Antitrust and Social Networking, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1771, 1791-92 (2012) (discussing
Facebook’s market power through lock-in effects); Warner, supra note 15.
192 Augmenting Compatibility and Competition by Enabling Service Switching (ACCESS) Act
of 2019, S. 2658, 116th Cong. § 5(f)(3) (2019).
193 See Greg McFarlane, How Facebook, Twitter, Social Media Make Money From You,
(Sept.
21,
2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/stockINVESTOPEDIA
analysis/032114/how-facebook-twitter-social-media-make-money-you-twtr-lnkd-fbgoog.aspx.
188
189
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services less desirable for firms and likely leave consumers with fewer interface
choices.194 Still, the internet is entirely devoid of effective alternative platform
interfaces at present,195 so providing some instead of none would be a significant
step forward.
By prying open concentrated digital markets to competitors, the ACCESS
Act would exert pressure on incumbents to behave better. For instance, in the
absence of effective competitors, Facebook rode through the 2018 public
backlash stronger than ever.196 But if users could have switched to another
platform while keeping their friend networks, the fizzled #deleteFacebook
movement would have almost certainly gained more traction.197 In Google’s
case, video recommendations its subsidiary YouTube makes have been observed
to steer users toward more extreme and outlandish content.198 Interoperability
might well divert market share from Google to an upstart competitor offering
more transparent and customizable recommendation algorithms.
Internet incumbents would of course strongly resist the ACCESS Act as a
regulatory challenge to their hegemony. They are much better funded than the
local telephone companies that managed to obstruct, delay, and finally overturn
the Telecommunications Act’s unbundling mandate,199 and have just as strong
an incentive to resist a mandate to interoperate with competitors.200 That reality
points out a major flaw in the ACCESS Act, its replication of one of the
mechanisms of the Telecommunications Act that did not go smoothly.

See John M. Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Foundations, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 149,
155-57 (2015) (discussing revenue strategies for zero-price markets, some of which the
ACCESS Act’s limitations on data custodians would preclude).
195 See Thomas E. Kadri, Digital Gatekeepers, 99 TEX. L. REV. 951, 976-977 (2021) (describing
MIT’s Gobo interface as a promising way for users to control what content displays in their
social media feeds that, at present, is hobbled by Facebook’s refusal to let it access posts from
friends).
196 James Thorne, Facebook Posts Strong Profits as Users Grow 9%, GEEKWIRE (Jan. 30, 2019),
https://www.geekwire.com/2019/facebook-posts-strong-profits-users-grow-9/ (describing
user, income growth despite “ongoing public backlash against the company’s privacy
practices”).
197
Stephen
Carrillo
et
al.,
#DELETEFACEBOOK,
#MOVEME
https://moveme.berkeley.edu/project/deletefacebook/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2021) (providing
statistics on the movement).
198 Mathew Ingram, The YouTube ‘Radicalization Engine’ Debate Continues, COLUM. JOURNALISM
REV. (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.cjr.org/the_media_today/YouTube-radicalization.php.
199 See supra text accompanying notes 100-01, 105-06 (discussing incumbent telephone
companies’ protracted and ultimately successful resistance to the mandate).
200 McIntosh, supra note 79, at 194-95 (discussing the competitive advantage and obstacle to
competitors’ entry that amassing large amounts of data confers on internet companies).
194
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C. WEAKNESSES OF THE ACCESS ACT

For companies such as Google and Facebook, whose business model is
centered around user-generated data, that data is their key input.201 Thus, the
ACCESS Act replicates the approach beset with problems when the
Telecommunications Act tried it two decades ago; expecting dominant firms to
facilitate competitors’ entry into their market by sharing their key input.202
Further, the ACCESS Act gives even less account to the entirely predictable
reluctance of dominant firms to do so than its telecommunications predecessor.
Rather than requiring incumbents to charge market entrants a reasonable fee for
the use of their facilities as in the Telecommunications Act, the ACCESS Act
forces them to provide competitors access for free up to a reasonable point.203 To
monopolists, the reasonable amount of free access to their key inputs is as little
as they can get away with. The monopolist has no market justification for helping
competitors enter its domain, so any transactions that take place will only happen
because of government coercion. When government agencies set prices at which
these transactions will take place, they do so without the benefit of firms’ internal
economic information. Thus, as in the telecommunications context, government
price-setting runs the risk of failing to properly incentivize competitors to enter
the market (if the price is too low) or undermining incentives for investment and
innovation (if it is too high).204
One element of the ACCESS Act that limits its potential to correct the
internet economy’s structural imbalances is that its 100 million U.S. user cutoff
means it only applies to the largest internet platforms.205 The ACCESS Act’s
sponsors attempt to strike a balance between addressing the biggest platforms’
dominance and not putting a damper on emerging firms’ incentive to innovate.
Further, they appear to have gleaned from Europe’s attempts at sector-specific
regulation that unless internet laws are drafted carefully, they can place a greater
burden on small and mid-size companies than large ones.206 Universally
201

Id.; Newman, supra note 67 at 403-04, 425–26.

202 See generally supra text accompanying notes 94-100 (discussing the Telecommunications Act’s

facilities-sharing mandate).
Supra text accompanying note 154; Augmenting Compatibility and Competition by
Enabling Service Switching (ACCESS) Act of 2019, S. 2658, 116th Cong. § 4(c)(2)(B)(i)-(iv)
(2019).

203

Hazlett, supra note 86, at 507-08.
Supra text accompanying notes 119-21.
206 Sam Schechner & Nick Kostov, Google and Facebook Likely to Benefit From Europe’s Privacy
Crackdown, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-europes-newprivacy-rules-favor-google-and-facebook-1524536324; Russell Brandom, Everything You Need
VERGE
(May
25,
2018),
to
Know
About
GDPR,
THE
https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/28/17172548/gdpr-compliance-requirements-privacynotice (“Regulations like this tend to hit small companies the hardest, so the GDPR might
also tip the scales even further toward big players like Google and Facebook . . . .”).
204
205
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applicable regulation disadvantages upstart tech companies relative to
incumbents, since incumbents have more resources to spend complying with
complex and demanding rules.207 Thus, to avoid disadvantaging smaller and
newer firms, it was necessary to include a user number threshold in the Act.
Placing the threshold at 100 million monthly active users, however, means
several of the most popular technology companies are not covered by the
ACCESS Act.208
Another problem with the ACCESS Act related to the high user number
threshold is that the interoperability mandate only applies to large
communications platforms, not platforms operated by large communications
providers. So, it would seem that a tech company like Facebook, which operates
several services that currently qualify as large communications platforms,209
could get around the interoperability mandate by splitting those services into
smaller platforms but still centrally managing them. Splitting itself up into smaller
(but still quite large) networks, perhaps based on region, age, or interests, might
well be less onerous to a company like Facebook than submitting to the ACCESS
Act’s interoperability demands. Thus, the ACCESS Act’s high user threshold and
formulaic applicability requirements appear to leave open a major loophole.
The possibility that mandating portability and interoperability will impose
homogeneity on internet services and forestall innovative new platform types
presents another concern about the ACCESS Act.210 It requires the National
Institute of Standards and Technology to create and publish model standards to
make interoperable three “popular classes of communications or information
services”—online messaging, multimedia sharing, and social networking.211 It is
plausible that an interoperability mandate could enshrine the present technology
and ways of thinking about the provision of these classes of service, at the
expense of outside-the-box innovation. However, examples from current social
media platforms suggest that concerns about interoperability mandates stifling
innovation are overblown. In an effort to fend off competition and keep users
on its apps, Facebook has copied and incorporated features that drove

Brandom, supra note 206.
See supra note 121 and accompanying text (stating that Twitter, Snapchat, and Pinterest are
exempt from the ACCESS Act’s requirements).
209 Adam Warner, Which Social Media Platform Has the Most Users? (2021), WEBSITE PLANET,
https://www.websiteplanet.com/blog/social-media-platform-users/ (last visited Nov. 6,
2021) (stating that Facebook and Instagram have more than 100 million active monthly U.S.
users).
210 Pethokoukis, supra note 170, (quoting law professor Daniel Lyons) (arguing that an
ACCESS Act-style interoperability mandate would encourage homogenization, which could
hamper the competitive dynamic of differentiation).
211 Augmenting Compatibility and Competition by Enabling Service Switching (ACCESS) Act
of 2019, S. 2658, 116th Cong. § 6(c) (2019).
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competitors’ success, such as Snapchat’s disappearing Stories212 and Tik Tok’s
short videos.213 Knowing that if one’s service takes off it will likely be copied by
the incumbent is surely a present disincentive to innovation.
By contrast, the playing field would be leveled in a world with interoperability.
Currently, the incumbent platform is able to add to the benefits of its established
network by copying an upstart’s successful new features and making them part
of its service. Meanwhile, upstarts struggle to grow or maintain market share
because users can access the feature that made them unique through their
account with the incumbent platform.214 In the interoperable system proposed
by the ACCESS Act, a competing platform could offer a new feature to earlyadopting users while still providing access to their set of connections from the
established platform.215 Thus, interoperability would make users more willing to
venture onto new platforms and allow innovative tech firms to capture more of
the benefits of their innovation than in the current arrangement. Rather than
interoperability dampening innovation, it is likely to promote it.
Beyond specific criticisms of the ACCESS Act, some commentators, like
Masnick, think major regulatory intervention might not even be necessary to fix
the internet if new technology makes the current platform models obsolete.216
He is hopeful that various decentralized internet services, like InterPlanetary File
System (IPFS) and Solid, may eventually provide compelling alternatives to the
current “great powers” model currently dominating the internet.217 Nonetheless,
these efforts, as well as upstart decentralized social media networks such as
Mastodon, haven’t gained much traction yet. IPFS debuted in 2015 and remains
a niche service requiring computer programming knowledge to effectively
access.218 The privacy-oriented Solid web platform is still in its pilot stage for
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215 See supra text accompanying notes 146-47 (describing how the ACCESS Act would allow
users of competing platforms to access content and connections from the incumbent
platform).
216 Masnick, supra note 2, at 32 (“Services like IPFS . . . are already laying the groundwork and
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companies and organizations.219 And Mastodon’s 4.4 million users,220 are still
only a tiny fraction of its competitor Twitter’s 186 million daily users.221 This
aspiring next generation of internet platforms faces an uphill battle against the
network effects of existing internet platforms as well as the public’s apparent
resignation to the current state of affairs.222
IV. CONCLUSION
Fittingly, this Note concludes by coming full circle to a second internet
declaration of independence. Dr. Larry Sanger, co-founder of Wikipedia,223
wrote his “Declaration of Digital Independence” in 2019.224 Barlow, in his 1996
“Cyberspace” declaration, warned against government interference and
control.225 Sanger, with twenty-three more years of perspective on how the
internet actually developed, warns against corporate interference and control.226
He stakes out the position that people have as much right to free speech, privacy,
and security on the internet as they do in general and that we, as a society, should
reconsider our willingness to give up those liberties.227
Visionaries like Sanger and Masnick are right to hope for something better
than the “proprietary, centralized architecture” of today’s internet and the harms
it fosters.228 Emerging technology may yet shift the internet toward user
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autonomy, decentralized innovation, free speech, privacy, and security.229 But it
does not follow from a belief that technological innovation will eventually
improve the situation that nothing should be done now. The sponsors of the
ACCESS Act and many others are calling for regulation to alleviate present ills
and facilitate the desired changes. If their efforts are successful, internet users
might not have to wait for an organic shift in the internet paradigm to get
effective data portability, interoperability, and delegatibility, and the free speech,
privacy, and security these innovations promote and protect.
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